



FOREIGN POLICY bulletin

AN ANALYSIS OF CURRENT INTERNATIONAL EVENTS

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Toward More Democracy in Mexico?

by Harry B. Murkland

A Mexican presidential election is traditionally a sham battle. Opposition parties and candidates have complete freedom of speech and publication. They can campaign as long and as loudly as they choose. Their supporters have a reasonable chance of casting their votes and even of having them counted. But the Administration always wins.

That will probably be the general pattern in the election scheduled for July 6. But developments in the campaign so far have deviated enough from the norm to suggest that this year's poll, however traditional its results, could be a milestone on the road to a more effective democracy in Mexico.

What seems to be happening there can only be understood against the background of the country's political history. From the beginning until 1934—except for the period of peace and order forcibly imposed by the Díaz dictatorship between 1884 and 1910—Mexican politics was mainly a matter of blood and bullets. Presidents were chosen by guns, not votes. A president lasted only until a candidate with more guns appeared. In half a century only two administrations were able to serve out their full legal terms.

General Lázaro Cárdenas, who became president in 1934, introduced a new political era. He eliminated the rebellious General Saturnino Cedillo, the last of the *caudillos*, the regional chieftains with private armies who were accustomed to fighting out the presidential succession. He built up a mass civilian party, the Partido Nacional Revolucionario (now the Partido Revolucionario Institucional or PRI), as the foundation of his power. When his term ended in 1940 he presided over a more or less free election and turned the presidency over to his elected successor, General Manuel Avila Camacho. Avila Camacho also governed the country in peace and order for a normal six-year term, then retired in favor of Miguel Alemán, victor in the 1946 election. Now Alemán is preparing to make room for the July winner.

In the past 18 years, then, Mexico has moved definitely toward political democracy. The army is no longer the nation's major political force. It has become a disciplined, professional body, not easily led or driven into political adventures. Symbolically, Alemán is the first civilian president in a long line of generals. There are half a dozen political

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parties functioning without interference from the government. The Mexican press is as free as any in the world. All this is progress.

But the goal has not been reached. For all the multiplicity of parties, the PRI is the only one that can win. No matter how heated a campaign may be, both sides know that it is shadow-boxing and that the result is foregone. Mexico's basic weakness, from the democratic point of view, is that, for all practical purposes, it is a one-party country.

One-Party Country

That party, the PRI, is made up, not of individuals, but of groups: labor unions, farmers' organizations, etc. Most of these owe their existence to the government and are still encouraged and in some cases financed by it. Their allegiance is therefore to the government, from which all blessings flow. They do not have to be forced to vote right. No matter how tolerant the government may be of opposition, the average Mexican is not tempted to give up the material advantages of conformity for the sake of an abstract democratic principle of which he has little knowledge or experience.

At the head of the party, as of the government, is the president, who is thus the all-powerful figure in Mexican politics. The constitutional division among executive, legislative and judicial branches has little practical meaning. The president, in effect, names congressmen and judges as well as his executive assistants. His control even extends to the

governments of the states.

To some extent, this is a hang-over from the old days of the *caudillos*, when the Indians and mestizos followed personal leaders rather than party principles. Today the president is a kind of constitutional *caudillo*.

While this system may be more or less traditionally Mexican, it is hardly democratic in the pure sense. The significance of the current campaign lies in the signs that have appeared that the country may be moving away from this one-party, one-leader order.

President Alemán himself deserves some of the credit for this apparent trend. He has, for example, made a great point of breaking with tradition by not hand-picking the congressional candidates of the PRI. In a statement issued last month he explained that he did not want to be charged with setting up a puppet government for his successor. The future, he said, is the next government's concern. Adolfo Ruiz Cortines, presidential candidate of the PRI, also has kept his hands off the congressional slate. The immediate result has been confusion in party ranks, but the long-term implications are encouraging.

Opponents of the PRI monopoly have also been unusually energetic this year. The three chief opposition groups, the Federation of People's Parties, Vicente Lombardo Toledano's far left Popular party, and the moderate Revolutionary party struggled for weeks to unite behind one candidate. The attempt failed,

because General Miguel Henríquez Guzmán, candidate of the Federation of People's Parties, refused to accept the Communist-line platform of the Popular party, and Lombardo Toledano was unwilling to withdraw unless the coalition accepted his platform completely. But the parties did agree on a joint list of congressional candidates. The Catholic National Action party refused to join the coalition.

While there is little doubt, therefore, that Ruiz Cortines will easily be elected president, there is a good chance that enough oppositionists will be elected to Congress to exert some kind of check on the top-heavy PRI majority. At present all but 4 of the 211 seats in Congress are filled by PRI members.

This new growth of the opposition seems to have definitely popular roots. Any political party that has been in power anywhere uninterruptedly and without serious threat to its continuance for two decades is bound to develop habits that lay it open to criticism. The critics of the PRI are lining up for practical action.

The thing that worries some Mexicans is whether they will be content to express themselves at the polls. There is probably little real danger of a revolution, although President Alemán has thought it necessary to warn his opponents against violence. Barring this, the July election promises to be a real step toward a two-party, and therefore more democratic, system.

(Mr. Murkland is *Hemisphere Affairs* editor of *Newsweek*.)

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Protectionism and Foreign Policy

The trend toward increased tariff protection which is becoming noticeable in the United States contradicts the common belief that a nation riven by disagreement over domestic affairs can unite "at the water's edge" on an effective coherent foreign policy. Some of the Congressmen who pride themselves on their willingness to appropriate money for building up military and economic strength in friendly countries in order to fortify our world position, at the same time hold back the progress of those countries in order to strengthen the competitive position of their domestic constituents.

Rise in Protectionism

Congress creates this contradictory situation by erecting barriers against the admission into the United States of goods from the very nations to which we give aid. Thus partisan trade policy proves a pitfall for bipartisan foreign policy. The United States demands that friendly countries which receive our aid should restrict their commerce with the East. The aim of this policy is to strengthen the coalition of non-Soviet nations and to withhold strategic materials from the Soviet bloc. But the non-Soviet nations, for reasons of economic logic, must trade with one of the two principal world areas—either the most productive area, which is the United States, or the most heavily populated, which is the Soviet Union plus its satellites. Whenever the United States restricts outlets here for the exports of the nations we aid, it makes it necessary for those nations to turn to the Soviet area.

Current protectionist sentiment

has been waxing for about a year. It formally came into view in the enactment last June of the "peril-point" principle in the revised Trade Agreements Act, requiring the Tariff Commission to give tariff relief to industries able to demonstrate that agreements negotiated under the act had caused them damage. Last summer Congress, through a rider to the Defense Production Act of 1951, limited the quantity of cheese and other dairy products which can be imported into this country. The Senate Finance Committee recently recommended that importers of fresh and frozen tuna, which now enters the country free, pay a tariff of three cents a pound. A rise in tariffs on thousands of other items without further Congressional action is possible, since the peril-point legislation (originally approved by the Republican-controlled Eightieth Congress in 1948 and dropped in 1949) has prompted more manufacturers and growers to seek relief from the Tariff Commission than at any time since the Trade Agreements Act, in 1934, began to lower the high tariff walls of the Smoot-Hawley Act.

Bipartisanship Problem

Secretary of State Dean Acheson has criticized protectionism by supporting protests against tariff restrictions submitted by the British and Italian governments. Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, the Netherlands, New Zealand and Norway have also either protested or taken counteraction. The restriction on imports of cheese and dairy products has adversely affected Canada and some of our best friends in Europe—Denmark, the Netherlands, France, Switzerland and Italy. A

tariff on tuna would harm Japan, a nation of fishermen which already is tempted to trade with the Soviet Union and Communist China. It would also harm Peru, which was encouraged by the United States to exploit Pacific fisheries in order to build up dollar-trade with the United States. This on-again-off-again attitude on the part of the United States does damage to the good name of this country all over the world. For example, on May 27 some European spokesmen in the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe contended that United States protective tariffs and excessive limitations on East-West trade threaten Europe's economy.

To cope with the assault of new protectionism on current foreign policy, the Truman Administration needs to make a really serious restudy of a basic American political problem. Is it possible for the President to create a bipartisan approach to the home issues that affect our undertakings abroad? Or, alternatively, is it possible to unite the members of the majority party in support of a coherent foreign and domestic policy in order to eliminate the need for bipartisanship? Or is it altogether impossible for the Federal government, as fundamentally organized, to produce a logical foreign policy reconciling domestic and foreign aspects? One argument in the case for bipartisanship is that it provides continuity in foreign policy from one presidential administration to another. But the recent rise of protectionism shows that foreign policy can lose continuity within the lifetime of a single administration.

BLAIR BOLLES



Will Germany Ratify?

The signing on May 26 in Bonn of the treaties and conventions constituting the contractual agreement between the Federal Republic of West Germany and the three Western powers restores to Germany most of the sovereignty it lost seven years ago when it accepted unconditional surrender. The European Defense Community treaty, signed on May 27 in Paris, is designed to provide the framework within which a nearly sovereign Germany will be permitted to acquire a measure of military power without, it is earnestly hoped by Germany's wartime victims, becoming once more a threat to Europe and the world.

France's last-minute anxiety about the re-emergence of a powerful militant Germany, which has haunted the French since 1945, was apparently allayed by a three-power guarantee against desertion of the European Defense Community by Germany or any other member nation. Washington's part of this guarantee will be incorporated in an executive order submitted to Congress by President Truman. Henceforth, the United States and Britain will consider any withdrawal from the European army by Germany or any other power as a threat to their own security. This is the kind of guarantee which the French vainly sought to obtain from the United States and Britain in 1919.

In tying together into a "package" the contractual agreement and the European Defense Community treaty the Western allies brushed aside the Soviet proposal of May 24 for an immediate Big Four meeting on German unification. This proposal, in Washington's opinion, is unac-

ceptable because it does not meet the United States-British-French condition for a conference of the four powers—namely that an international commission should be appointed to determine the conditions which would have to exist in order to hold free elections in both the Eastern and Western zones of Germany.

Moscow's Next Step

Some observers, both American and European, believe that the signing of the Bonn and Paris agreements marks not only the end of Western occupation, but also intensification of Moscow's efforts to prevent the integration of a rearmed West German state into the European Defense Community.

The U.S.S.R. is not expected to make the German question a cause of war. But, in addition to further restrictions on German East-West communications, the Russians may announce the end of their occupation of East Germany, and ultimately the transformation of East Germany into a "people's democracy."

In either case, it would be possible for the Russians to withdraw to the background, and have East German leaders take the initiative in pressing for the unification of Germany. It is also recalled that several German military leaders, notably General von Paulus who surrendered to the Russians at Stalingrad, remained in the U.S.S.R., and may have at their disposal 100,000 or more German soldiers who did not return from wartime imprisonment. The possibility that a German military force under German officers might at some time play a part in seeking the "liberation"

of a united Germany from Western influence cannot be discounted.

Pressure for unification, whether it comes from Moscow or from East German spokesmen, may find the German public in a receptive mood. The West Germans want neither communism nor domination by Russia. But, irrespective of political opinions, they are reluctant to abandon the hope for the restoration of German unity in the visible future. This was indicated by the press of West Berlin over the weekend of May 24, including *Der Tag*, Berlin organ of Chancellor Konrad Adenauer's Christian Democratic party. West Berlin's Social Democratic Mayor Ernst Reuter, regarded as a staunch friend of the West, said at a convention of Social Democrats on May 25 that the contractual agreement could be ratified only by "an all-German government following an all-German election."

Elections in West Germany are scheduled for 1953. Ratification might thus be postponed for six months to a year. This, apparently, is what French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman had in mind when he told the first general assembly of the International Press Institute in Paris on May 14 that the lapse of time between the signing of the contractual agreement and its ratification by the parliaments of the four countries would provide opportunities for Moscow to elaborate its unification proposals. The French, like the Germans, although for different reasons, continue to hope that the Western powers will not slam the door shut on negotiations with Moscow.

VERA MICHELES DEAN



FPA Quizzes Presidential Candidates

Here are the answers of six Presidential candidates to the three questions about United States foreign policy which, according to a sampling of opinion, are of most concern to members of the Foreign Policy Association. The answers of General Eisenhower and Mr. Stassen, and one of the answers of Senator Kerr, were selected by the candidates or their spokesmen from previously published speeches or writings. All other answers were specially prepared for the FPA.—*The Editor*

1: HOW DO YOU PROPOSE TO RESTORE CONFIDENCE AT HOME AND ABROAD IN THE CONDUCT OF OUR FOREIGN POLICY?

General Dwight D. Eisenhower: "The best foreign policy is to live our lives in honesty, decency and integrity; at home, making our own land a more fitting habitation for free men; and abroad, joining with those of like mind and heart, to make of the world a place where all men can dwell in peace. Neither palsied by fear nor duped by dreams but strong in the rightness of our purpose, we can then place our case and cause before the bar of world opinion—history's final arbiter between nations."

Silver Lecture on International Peace, Columbia University, March 3, 1950.

W. Averell Harriman: I believe that confidence—at home and abroad—comes from sound policies, clearly accepted by people who understand the issues at stake. Many of the apparent disagreements among our own people and between the Western allies result more from a difference in emphasis than from basic

conflicts. In my opinion, the American people *do* have confidence in our foreign policy, and it would be a grave mistake to compromise that policy just to placate the faint-hearted among us. We must vigorously oppose those who do not believe the United States has the will, the resources or the imagination to surmount the great foreign policy problems of our day and take the steps necessary to achieve peace. 1952 is a year of special crisis in the West, and any hesitation or faltering in our leadership would jeopardize all we have done to build strength in the free world. For this reason we must be especially careful not to mistake minor differences over details for major differences in basic policies. Our basic policies are right, and I believe the American people know they are right.

Senator Estes Kefauver: By working for greater agreement and unity of purpose at home. We should strive to keep our foreign policy not only bipartisan, but nonpartisan. It should reflect the views and have the support of the nation and not just one party. It should be based on principles, not mere expediency. It should be applied as openly as possible.

If we achieve this, the people will have reason to have confidence in it and to feel secure about it. A policy based on these roots will command confidence abroad because both our friends and our enemies will know that, being truly national and truly representative, it will have continuity, predictability and firmness.

Senator Robert S. Kerr: By giving more information to the general pub-

lic where national security permits; by more consultation with appropriation committees of the Congress; by a sincere and continued effort for bipartisan formulation and support of basic foreign policies; by the development of more frankness and mutual confidence on a bipartisan basis, believing that national security is above, and more important than, partisan consideration. Therefore, on this issue, politics should end at the water's edge.

Harold E. Stassen: In foreign policy, I feel very strongly that we in America should adopt a new policy that is not isolationist, that is not timid, but that gives very forthright leadership towards the expanding freedom of men and the advance in their conditions of living. If we advance that kind of a foreign policy, I am optimistic that we can gradually weaken and bring about the fall of communism without the tragedy of a third world war. . . . The founding fathers of America were right in the great principles upon which they founded this nation, and if we project those principles out toward the world, we will have a successful foreign policy. . . . We need a foreign policy conducted by a reorganized State Department, and we need to recruit the kind of personnel to lead the State Department in the future in that kind of a foreign policy.

Radio Address on CBS Program "Presidential Profiles," April 17, 1952.

Senator Robert A. Taft: The people of this country demand a voice in the determination of foreign policy. I can judge by the mail that I receive. They regard their Senators and Congressmen as their voice.

They resent arbitrary neglect to give them even the basic knowledge on which an opinion can be formed. Certainly their position is right today, for the present foreign policy affects every domestic policy.

In the past most of our Presidents have been imbued, I believe, with a real determination to keep the country at peace. I feel that the last two Presidents have put all kinds of political considerations ahead of their interest in liberty and peace. No foreign policy, either in the present situation or in ordinary times, can be truly justified unless it is devoted without reservation or diversion of purpose to the protection of the liberty of the American people, with war only as the last resort and only to preserve that liberty.

I would offer a reorganization of the State Department, to put in charge men of ability and sound judgment to make the day-to-day decisions, men who believe in the principles of America and are constantly guided by those principles.

2. SHOULD U.S. CONTINUE THE PRESENT LEVEL OF SPENDING TO ASSIST WESTERN EUROPEAN NATIONS? WHAT PROPORTION SHOULD GO TO MILITARY SUPPORT?

Eisenhower: "Military strength is of little worth unless backed by healthy, expanding economies. In this truth is found the source of many of our bitterest problems. Yet, from the very beginning of our endeavor, we have been able to draw some confidence from the knowledge that NATO's economic potential is superior to that of the East. This potential springs from the productive peoples of the Atlantic community who hold in their grasp the greatest economic production, the most advanced technology the world has yet seen. . . .

"This brings to both national and

combined staffs the great responsibility of eliminating every trace of luxury in organization and in size and design of equipment. Utility, emphasized to the point of austerity, is the only guide to produce the required items at reasonable cost. We must be careful that we do not prove that free countries can be defended only at the cost of bankruptcy. . . .

"But America cannot continue to be the primary source of munitions for the entire free world. To do so would be militarily unsound. Moreover, the United States cannot long continue such expenditures without endangering her own economic structure. The soundness of that structure is of vital concern to the entire free world, for its collapse would be a world-shaking tragedy. . . .

"It would be fatuous for anyone to assume that the taxpayers of America will continue to pour money and resources into Europe unless encouraged by steady progress toward mutual cooperation and full effectiveness. . . ."

NATO Report, April 2, 1952.

Harriman: The present level of our "assistance" to Western Europe is based on a most careful estimate of what is needed to continue the build-up of the defensive strength of the North Atlantic area. It is part and parcel of our national defense program. The exact amount of assistance in the future, and the proportion that goes for direct military assistance, cannot be predicted far in advance but must be based on frequent, up-to-the-minute surveys of what is needed for defense against Soviet aggression or Communist subversion from within. I am convinced that once the initial build-up agreed to at Lisbon is completed, the need for extraordinary American assistance for the defense of Western Europe will taper off substantially.

Kefauver: Both we and our allies are now faced with the same dilemma. On the one hand, the need for adequate preparedness, on the other hand the risk of economic crisis to which the strain of deficit financing caused by rearmament expenditures exposes us. Until we and our allies have attained adequate military insurance against aggression and until our allies, on whom the strain has been very much greater, are able to undertake a higher proportion of the burden, it seems to me that we must continue to give them assistance. We should, however, realistically re-examine the need and redistribute and equalize the burden to the largest extent possible easing our own share. I have always felt that economic aid, the Point Four program and similar nonmilitary measures are much sounder and more valuable in the long run. Therefore, I believe the proportion of such aid should be increased.

Kerr: Our aim is to prevent war if possible or win it if it is forced upon us. At Lisbon the member nations of NATO agreed to build a European Defense Force of 50 divisions plus 4,000 aircraft by the end of 1952. Europe will carry its share of the burden. Our allies there have more than doubled their defense budgets and will provide 90 percent of the 50 divisions. . . .

We and they have a common interest in this defense effort. They cannot stand alone. We could not succeed alone. In their own self-interest, they help us. In the interest of our own and the common defense, we help them. Experience has proved that as we help them, they build far more than they could without our help. Thus, the munitions we send equip and arm their manpower, to increase the common defense.

We must not be extravagant, but, in our own interest, we should be

fair. Neither should we pinch pennies in aid which would require dollars in direct cost. We are preparing today that we may be safe tomorrow.

Our determination to insure our own safety persuades us to provide that amount of military and financial aid which will encourage and enable our allies to make their greatest possible contribution in production and effective manpower for their own and therefore the common defense.

Stassen: "I think that America, as the leading nation in the world, from both a production and credit standpoint, must contemplate a continuing relationship on an economic-aid basis. It has to be fitted into a balanced budget at home. When you think of the long-term struggle, you have to bring the domestic budget down into balance. So, it cannot be excessive. I think it should have conditions on it, very business-like. It should insist that the aid not be used for socialistic schemes, that it does not get into the black markets, that they develop the raw materials that they have which we need in our own future economic expansion."

Interview with U.S. News & World Report, May 16, 1952.

Taft: I believe that the time to end economic aid to Europe has definitely arrived. These nations have been able to increase their production far above prewar through our assistance. I do not think that perpetual financial assistance is good either for the country which extends it or for that which receives it.

As a general proposition, I believe we should undertake to arm those countries which show their good faith in desiring to defend themselves against Communist aggression. We ought to complete the European project. But as General Eisenhower pointed out, the bulk of the army

there must be provided by the Western Europeans themselves. They have 220 million people compared to our 150 million. If they will not defend themselves, we certainly would not be able to defend them.

3. HOW CAN THE U.S. HELP IMPROVE SOCIAL, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CONDITIONS IN UNDERDEVELOPED AREAS?

Eisenhower: General Eisenhower has made no direct statement on this specific question. However, in a letter of May 3, 1952 to Senator Tom Connally, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, he endorsed the pending Foreign Aid Program, which includes appropriations for social, economic and political aid to underdeveloped areas.

Harriman: The United States already is helping to improve conditions in underdeveloped areas through Point Four programs and substantial contributions to United Nations agencies. From the progress that has already been made in South America and in certain countries in Africa and Asia, we know that food production can be increased rapidly and that phenomenal strides in improving health conditions and wiping out disease can be made. Our Point Four program requires know-how and money, but even more important is a sympathetic understanding of the needs and hopes of other people. We are not trying to remake the world in our own image, but we are profoundly interested in helping other peoples help themselves.

Kefauver: Many social and political problems have an economic basis. To that extent, we can help the underdeveloped areas improve their general welfare by providing them with the means to raise their own standards of life, health and education. By and large, however, im-

provements in conditions will have to come from within. They cannot be imposed from without, no matter how good and unselfish the intention.

Still, much can be done to help the underdeveloped countries to help themselves: specifically, by sharing with them our science and technical know-how through our own Point Four program and the United Nations Technical Assistance Program; by loans both from private and public sources, to build up their industry and improve agricultural efficiency; by supporting the work of the World Health Organization, the Food and Agriculture Organization, the International Labor Organization, and other United Nations agencies; by expanding and freeing world trade; by continuing to offer living proof through our example and even more through our actions that social, economic and political well-being (and moral and spiritual as well) can only be achieved under a democratic form of government such as ours.

The "how" of this question is one thing. The "whether or not" is another.

In my opinion, the need for helping the underdeveloped countries to help themselves is imperative if the rising flames of revolution are not to spread and destroy us all.

Kerr: "The building of collective security forces is only a part of the answer. The problem in some areas of the world is of a different kind and cannot be solved with military measures. The Kremlin threatens some countries with armed force; it seeks to win others with fraudulent promises that economic and social progress is available through communism. These false appeals are camouflaged to appear attractive to hungry, impoverished, illiterate people who are tempted to turn to any

system that promises them relief from their desperate plight.

"There is an effective answer to these false promises of communism. We must show that the economic and social systems of free men are better able to satisfy the aspirations of all people everywhere. We can and must prove that communism destroys, but that the free world protects the liberty of the individual. In passing upon legislation and appropriations for foreign aid, the Congress must to the greatest possible extent secure these ends. . . .

"I am convinced that Point Four is our most attractive, and in the long run probably our most effective, bid for peace. This program has a spiritual quality which I think truly reflects the real character of the American people."

"The Place of Point 4 in American Foreign Policy," *Congressional Record*, June 15, 1951.

Stassen: "The same underlying process of seeking the future freedom of all mankind under God would motivate our policies toward other nations outside the Communist curtain. Thus our influence would be used toward expanding the freedom of the peoples within Yugoslavia, Spain and Argentina. Our influence would further be used toward liberalizing the empire policies of the British and the French, the

Dutch, the Belgians and the Portuguese.

We would not have a dreamer's notion of remaking the world overnight, but we would have ever in mind the basic ideals on which this country was first founded and under which it made its amazing progress."

Address to Republican Club of the District of Columbia, Washington, D.C., February 28, 1952.

Taft: I do not think the American people want to run the world, and I do not think they would be very good at it if they tried. I believe we ought to keep out of the internal affairs of other countries. I think we should set a good example and persuade others to follow us. . . .

I am in favor of bringing economic support of foreign nations to an end, except, first, if there is some emergency like a famine as in India or excessive immigration of displaced persons as in Israel, or second, technical assistance along the lines of the present Point Four program which is not expensive to us and which gives those nations advice and assistance they probably could not otherwise obtain. But the carrying out of the projects recommended ought to be their own concern or else they ought to be placed on an economic basis in which private capital can be interested.

FPA Bookshelf

BOOKS ON U.S. POLICY

The Irony of American History, by Reinhold Niebuhr. New York, Scribner, 1952. \$2.50.

The distinguished theologian and philosopher, in this stimulating little book, discusses some of the unexpected contradictions the United States faces now that it has become a great power much against its will, and attempts to clarify our moral responsibilities. The chapter on "The International Class Struggle" is particularly challenging.

A Foreign Policy for Americans, by Robert A. Taft. New York, Doubleday, 1951. \$2.

A Republican presidential candidate sets forth his views on the role of the President and Congress in the making of foreign policy and on specific questions of how the United States should deal with Russia and communism in Europe and Asia.

What Eisenhower Thinks, by Allan Taylor. New York, Crowell, 1952. \$2.75.

An excellent collection of statements by General Eisenhower on national and international issues since World War II. His representative speeches on labor and management, civil rights, education, communism, military preparedness and American foreign policy have been organized and interpreted by a member of *The New York Times* staff.

Eisenhower, by John Gunther. New York, Harper, 1951. \$2.50.

A slim, tightly-packed volume, both informative and entertaining, about Eisenhower the man. Mr. Gunther is objective in his praise and criticism, and although he gives sparse information about the general's stand on domestic issues, he paints a broad picture of his character, personality and potentialities.

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In the next issue

Foreign Policy Report

**The Peron Regime
and the United States**

by Thomas F. McGann of Harvard University,
who has lived in Argentina during and
since Peron's rise to power

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